Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s / Eugene N. White.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- G01 - Financial Crises
- G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages
- N12 - U.S. • Canada: 1913&ndash
- N22 - U.S. • Canada: 1913&ndash
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w15573 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
December 2009.
Although long obscured by the Great Depression, the nationwide "bubble" that appeared in the early 1920s and burst in 1926 was similar in magnitude to the recent real estate boom and bust. Fundamentals, including a post-war construction catch-up, low interest rates and a "Greenspan put," helped to ignite the boom in the twenties, but alternative monetary policies would have only dampened not eliminated it. Both booms were accompanied by securitization, a reduction in lending standards, and weaker supervision. Yet, the bust in the twenties, which drove up foreclosures, did not induce a collapse of the banking system. The elements absent in the 1920s were federal deposit insurance, the "Too Big To Fail" doctrine, and federal policies to increase mortgages to higher risk homeowners. This comparison suggests that these factors combined to induce increased risk-taking that was crucial to the eruption of the recent and worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.