Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq / Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph H. Felter.
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- F51 - International Conflicts • Negotiations • Sanctions
- F52 - National Security • Economic Nationalism
- H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
- H43 - Project Evaluation • Social Discount Rate
- H56 - National Security and War
- O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O53 - Asia including Middle East
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w14606 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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December 2008.
We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory's predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the "surge" began in 2007.
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