Estimating Matching Games with Transfers / Jeremy T. Fox.
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- C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
- C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
- C71 - Cooperative Games
- D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L62 - Automobiles • Other Transportation Equipment • Related Parts and Equipment
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w14382 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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October 2008.
I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market. I apply the estimator to data on the car parts supplied by automotive suppliers to estimate the returns from different portfolios of parts to suppliers and automotive assemblers.
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