On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument / Andrew Atkeson, V. V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe.
Material type: TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w13398.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):- E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
- E31 - Price Level • Inflation • Deflation
- E4 - Money and Interest Rates
- E42 - Monetary Systems • Standards • Regimes • Government and the Monetary System • Payment Systems
- E51 - Money Supply • Credit • Money Multipliers
- E52 - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
- E61 - Policy Objectives • Policy Designs and Consistency • Policy Coordination
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w13398 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
September 2007.
The optimal choice of a monetary policy instrument depends on how tight and transparent the available instruments are and on whether policymakers can commit to future policies. Tightness is always desirable; transparency is only if policymakers cannot commit. Interest rates, which can be made endogenously tight, have a natural advantage over money growth and exchange rates, which cannot. As prices, interest and exchange rates are more transparent than money growth. All else equal, the best instrument is interest rates and the next-best, exchange rates. These findings are consistent with the observed instrument choices of developed and less-developed economies.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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