Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security / Howard Kunreuther, Gabriel Silvasi, Eric T. Bradlow, Dylan Small.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- C11 - Bayesian Analysis: General
- C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General
- C22 - Time-Series Models • Dynamic Quantile Regressions • Dynamic Treatment Effect Models • Diffusion Processes
- C23 - Panel Data Models • Spatio-temporal Models
- C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber t0341 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
August 2007.
This paper examines experiments on interdependent security prisoner's dilemma games with repeated play. By utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model, we examine how subjects make investment decisions as a function of their previous experience and their treatment condition. Our main findings are that individuals have differing underlying propensities to invest that vary across time, are affected by both the stochastic nature of the game and even more so by an individual's ability to learn about his or her counterpart's choices. Implications for individual decisions and the likely play of a person's counterpart are discussed in detail.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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