Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know, and When Do They Know It? / Dirk Jenter, Katharina Lewellen, Jerold B. Warner.
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- G1 - General Financial Markets
- G14 - Information and Market Efficiency • Event Studies • Insider Trading
- G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
- G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
- G35 - Payout Policy
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w12724 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
December 2006.
We study put option sales undertaken by corporations during their repurchase programs. Put sales' main theoretical motivation is market timing, providing an excellent framework for studying whether security issues reflect managers' ability to identify mispricing. Our evidence is that these bets reflect timing ability, and are not simply a result of overconfidence. In the 100 days following put option issues, there is roughly a 5% abnormal stock price return, and the abnormal return is concentrated around the first earnings release date following put option sales. Longer term effects are generally not detected. Put sales also appear to reflect successful bets on the direction of stock price volatility.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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