Deposit Insurance and the Composition of Bank Suspensions in Developing Economies: Lessons from the State Deposit Insurance Experiments of the 1920S / Ching-Yi Chung, Gary Richardson.
Material type:
TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w12594.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): - E42 - Monetary Systems • Standards • Regimes • Government and the Monetary System • Payment Systems
- E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics • Industrial Structure • Growth • Fluctuations
- N14 - Europe: 1913&ndash
- O16 - Financial Markets • Saving and Capital Investment • Corporate Finance and Governance
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
| Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w12594 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
October 2006.
Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All abandoned the systems between 1921 and 1930. Scholars debate the costs and benefits of these policy experiments. New data drawn from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions in these states. In typical years, suspensions due to runs fell. Suspensions due to mismanagement rose. During the penultimate year of each system, the bank failure rate rose to an unsustainable height and the system ceased operations.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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