Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences / Raj Chetty, Adam Szeidl.
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- E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy
- H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
- J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w12467 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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August 2006.
Many households devote a large fraction of their budgets to "consumption commitments" -- goods that involve transaction costs and are infrequently adjusted. This paper characterizes risk preferences in an expected utility model with commitments. We show that commitments affect risk preferences in two ways: (1) they amplify risk aversion with respect to moderate-stake shocks and (2) they create a motive to take large-payoff gambles. The model thus helps resolve two basic puzzles in expected utility theory: the discrepancy between moderate-stake and large-stake risk aversion and lottery playing by insurance buyers. We discuss applications of the model such as the optimal design of social insurance and tax policies, added worker effects in labor supply, and portfolio choice. Using event studies of unemployment shocks, we document evidence consistent with the consumption adjustment patterns implied by the model.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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