Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con / Lars E.O. Svensson.

By:

Svensson, Lars E.O

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National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w11537.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.

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Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w11537 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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August 2005.

The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.