Systemic Crises and Growth / Romain Ranciere, Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann.

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Ranciere, Romain

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w11076.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where contract enforce-ability problems generate borrowing constraints and impede growth. In the set of financially liberalized countries with a moderate degree of contract enforceability, systemic risk-taking relaxes borrowing constraints and increases investment. This leads to higher mean growth, but also to greater incidence of crises. We find that the negative link between skewness and growth is indeed strongest in this set of countries, validating the restrictions imposed by the model's equilibrium.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w11076 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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January 2005.

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where contract enforce-ability problems generate borrowing constraints and impede growth. In the set of financially liberalized countries with a moderate degree of contract enforceability, systemic risk-taking relaxes borrowing constraints and increases investment. This leads to higher mean growth, but also to greater incidence of crises. We find that the negative link between skewness and growth is indeed strongest in this set of countries, validating the restrictions imposed by the model's equilibrium.