Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on U.S. Electric Generation Efficiency / Kira Markiewicz, Nancy L. Rose, Catherine Wolfram.
Material type: TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w11001.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):- L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms
- L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Electric Utilities
- D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w11001 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
December 2004.
While neoclassical models assume static cost-minimization by firms, agency models suggest that firms may not minimize costs in less-competitive or regulated environments. We test this using a transition from cost-of-service regulation to market-oriented environments for many U.S. electric generating plants. Our estimates of input demand suggest that publicly-owned plants, whose owners were largely insulated from these reforms, experienced the smallest efficiency gains, while investor-owned plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets improved the most. The results suggest modest medium-term efficiency benefits from replacing regulated monopoly with a market-based industry structure.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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