Patent Licensing and the Research University / Richard A. Jensen, Marie C. Thursby.

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Jensen, Richard A

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w10758.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: We construct a dynamic model of university research that allows us to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of US research universities. We assume a principal-agent framework in which the university administration is the principal and a faculty researcher is the agent. Whether or not the researcher remains in the university, and if so her choice of the amount of time to spend on basic and applied research, is complicated by the fact that she earns license income and prestige both inside and outside the university. Thus in contrast to usual principal agent models the participation constraint is endogenous. This, plus the fact that current research affects future knowledge stocks, allows us to show that it is far from obvious that licensing will damage basic research and education.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
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September 2004.

We construct a dynamic model of university research that allows us to examine recent concerns that financial incentives associated with university patent licensing are detrimental to the traditional mission of US research universities. We assume a principal-agent framework in which the university administration is the principal and a faculty researcher is the agent. Whether or not the researcher remains in the university, and if so her choice of the amount of time to spend on basic and applied research, is complicated by the fact that she earns license income and prestige both inside and outside the university. Thus in contrast to usual principal agent models the participation constraint is endogenous. This, plus the fact that current research affects future knowledge stocks, allows us to show that it is far from obvious that licensing will damage basic research and education.