Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation / Marc T. Law, Sukkoo Kim.

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Law, Marc T

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w10467.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: This paper explores the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. Was licensing regulation introduced to limit competition in the market for professional services at the expense of efficiency? Or was licensing adopted to reduce informational asymmetries about professional quality? To investigate these hypotheses, we analyze the determinants of licensing legislation and the effect of licensing on entry into eleven occupations. We also examine the impact of medical licensing laws on entry into the medical profession, physician earnings, mortality rates, and the incidence of medical malpractice. We believe that, at least for the Progressive Era, the evidence is more consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis than the industry capture hypothesis.

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Previous	nber w10464 Death Spiral or Euthanasia? The Demise of Generous Group Health Insurance Coverage /	nber w10465 Factor Substitution and Unobserved Factor Quality in Nursing Homes /	nber w10466 Social Security and the Evolution of Elderly Poverty /	nber w10467 Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation /	nber w10468 Soft Information, Hard Sell: The Role of Soft Information in the Pricing of Intellectual Property /	nber w10469 Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle /	nber w1047 The Real Interest Rate: A Multi-Country Empirical Study /	Next

May 2004.

This paper explores the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. Was licensing regulation introduced to limit competition in the market for professional services at the expense of efficiency? Or was licensing adopted to reduce informational asymmetries about professional quality? To investigate these hypotheses, we analyze the determinants of licensing legislation and the effect of licensing on entry into eleven occupations. We also examine the impact of medical licensing laws on entry into the medical profession, physician earnings, mortality rates, and the incidence of medical malpractice. We believe that, at least for the Progressive Era, the evidence is more consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis than the industry capture hypothesis.