Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating / Brian A. Jacob, Steven D. Levitt.

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Jacob, Brian A

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w9413.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago Public Schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4-5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. Moreover, the observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, often induce behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine.

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Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w9413 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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Previous	nber w9410 Pareto Improving Social Security Reform when Financial Markets are Incomplete? /	nber w9411 Fractionalization /	nber w9412 Trading with the Unborn: A New Perspective on Capital Income Taxation /	nber w9413 Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating /	nber w9414 Catching Cheating Teachers: The Results of an Unusual Experiment in Implementing Theory /	nber w9415 Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities /	nber w9416 Oligopoly Deregulation in General Equilibrium: A Tax Neutralization Result /	Next

January 2003.

We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago Public Schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4-5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. Moreover, the observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, often induce behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine.