Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production / Elhanan Helpman, Gene M. Grossman.

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Helpman, Elhanan

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w9403.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2002.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main result concerns the sorting of firms with different productivity levels into different organizational forms. We use the model to examine the implications of falling trade costs for the relevant prevalence of outsourcing and foreign direct investment.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w9403 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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December 2002.

We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main result concerns the sorting of firms with different productivity levels into different organizational forms. We use the model to examine the implications of falling trade costs for the relevant prevalence of outsourcing and foreign direct investment.