Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy / Lucian Arye Bebchuk.
Material type: TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w8388.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2001.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w8388 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
July 2001.
A basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority. Research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects. In contrast, this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders. Such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice - increasing the equityholders' incentive to favor risky projects - as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.