Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets / Daron Acemoglu, Jorn-Steffen Pischke.

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Acemoglu, Daron

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w6740.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1998.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w6740 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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September 1998.

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models.