The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand / Timothy Frye, Andrei Shleifer.

By:

Frye, Timothy

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w5856.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The evidence suggests that the `invisible hand' model of government better fits the Warsaw local government, and the`grabbing hand' model is more appropriate for Moscow. The evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced, and that the quality of government may be as essential.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w5856 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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Previous	nber w5853 Product Standards Coalitions in a Market Without Borders /	nber w5854 Effective Protection Redux /	nber w5855 The Timing of Work Time Over Time /	nber w5856 The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand /	nber w5857 Consumption and Portfolio Decisions When Expected Returns are Time Varying /	nber w5858 Accounting for Outward Direct Investment from Hong Kong and Singapore: Who Controls What? /	nber w5859 The Characteristics of Multi-Unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from Fast-Food Restaurants in Texas /	Next

December 1996.

Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The evidence suggests that the `invisible hand' model of government better fits the Warsaw local government, and the`grabbing hand' model is more appropriate for Moscow. The evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced, and that the quality of government may be as essential.