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Public Policy for Health Care / David M. Cutler.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w5591.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Abstract: This paper reviews the public sector role in the provision of health care. A first role of the government is to use tax policy to correct externalities associated with individual behaviors. Estimates suggest that the external effects of many `sins' such as alcohol consumption are greater than current taxes on these goods. A second role of the government is to correct distortions in markets for medical care and health insurance. Markets for health insurance have traditionally not offered a choice between cost and the generosity of benefits. As a result, there have been incentives for excessive technological development, particularly technologies that increase spending. Once technologies have diffused widely, they are overutilized. Policies to increase choice in insurance markets could increase welfare, provided they limit segmentation on the basis of risk.
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May 1996.

This paper reviews the public sector role in the provision of health care. A first role of the government is to use tax policy to correct externalities associated with individual behaviors. Estimates suggest that the external effects of many `sins' such as alcohol consumption are greater than current taxes on these goods. A second role of the government is to correct distortions in markets for medical care and health insurance. Markets for health insurance have traditionally not offered a choice between cost and the generosity of benefits. As a result, there have been incentives for excessive technological development, particularly technologies that increase spending. Once technologies have diffused widely, they are overutilized. Policies to increase choice in insurance markets could increase welfare, provided they limit segmentation on the basis of risk.

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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