Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff / Douglas A. Irwin, Randall S. Kroszner.

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Irwin, Douglas A

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w5510.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: We analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of the debates in the Congressional Record suggests that the final, party-line voting masks a rich vote- trading dynamic. We estimate a logit model of specific tariff votes that permits us to identify (a) important influences of specific producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency and (b) log- rolling coalitions among Senators with otherwise unrelated constituency interests which succeeded in raising tariff rates.

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Previous	nber w5507 Inflation Targeting in a St. Louis Model of the 21st Century /	nber w5508 Fixed Costs: The Demise of Marginal q /	nber w5509 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment /	nber w5510 Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff /	nber w5511 Second-Best Pollution Taxes /	nber w5512 "Social Security Privatization: A Structure for Analysis" /	nber w5513 Tax Principles and Capital Inflows: Is It Efficient to Tax Nonresident Income? /	Next

March 1996.

We analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of the debates in the Congressional Record suggests that the final, party-line voting masks a rich vote- trading dynamic. We estimate a logit model of specific tariff votes that permits us to identify (a) important influences of specific producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency and (b) log- rolling coalitions among Senators with otherwise unrelated constituency interests which succeeded in raising tariff rates.