Image from Google Jackets

Incentives in Basic Research / Edward P. Lazear.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w5444.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Abstract: Individuals involved in basic research, like other workers, respond to incentives. Funding agencies provide implicit incentives when they specify the rules by which awards are made. The following analysis is an exercise in understanding incentives at an applied level. Specific rules are examined and analyzed to determine their incentive effects. For example, what is the effect of rewarding past effort? What happens when a few large awards are replaced by many small awards? How does the timing of an award affect effort? How does an agency choose which topics to fund? After having mapped out the responses of researchers to rules, socially optimal rules are derived. Research incentive issues have private business analogues, and the extension to the operation of the firm is discussed briefly.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

January 1996.

Individuals involved in basic research, like other workers, respond to incentives. Funding agencies provide implicit incentives when they specify the rules by which awards are made. The following analysis is an exercise in understanding incentives at an applied level. Specific rules are examined and analyzed to determine their incentive effects. For example, what is the effect of rewarding past effort? What happens when a few large awards are replaced by many small awards? How does the timing of an award affect effort? How does an agency choose which topics to fund? After having mapped out the responses of researchers to rules, socially optimal rules are derived. Research incentive issues have private business analogues, and the extension to the operation of the firm is discussed briefly.

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Print version record

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

Powered by Koha