Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features / Maurice Obstfeld.

By:

Obstfeld, Maurice

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w5285.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1995.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

Online resources:

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Abstract: The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange- rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems to support the practical importance of these mechanisms.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w5285 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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October 1995.

The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange- rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems to support the practical importance of these mechanisms.