The Economic Consequences of Legislative Oversight: Theory and Evidencefrom the Medical Profession / Shawn Everett Kantor, Patrick Legros.

By:

Kantor, Shawn Everett

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w4281.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1993.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: This paper provides a positive analysis of how formal, periodic legislative oversight of regulatory agencies can influence market outcomes and the welfare of regulated industries. Whereas previous research has focused on the political distinction between passive and active legislative oversight, this paper shows that there exists an important economic difference between two mechanisms as well. We develop a principal-agent model that describes how a regulatory agent's incentives are influenced if its actions are publicly scrutinized. Our empirical analysis supports our claim that formal oversight leads to measurable economic effects.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w4281 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

February 1993.

This paper provides a positive analysis of how formal, periodic legislative oversight of regulatory agencies can influence market outcomes and the welfare of regulated industries. Whereas previous research has focused on the political distinction between passive and active legislative oversight, this paper shows that there exists an important economic difference between two mechanisms as well. We develop a principal-agent model that describes how a regulatory agent's incentives are influenced if its actions are publicly scrutinized. Our empirical analysis supports our claim that formal oversight leads to measurable economic effects.