Does Employer Monopsony Power Increase Occupational Accidents? The Case of Kentucky Coal Mines / Shulamit Kahn.

By:

Kahn, Shulamit

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w3897.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: A popular argument for safety regulations is that workers accept dangerous jobs because they have "no choice," or, in other words, because they have few or no alternative employment opportunities. This argument is considered in a game-theoretic framework. Because simultaneous-entry models do not yield pure-strategy equilibria, this paper develops a sequential-entry model to analyze the effect of additional firms on occupational safety. Within the context of the particular functional specification modeled, additional firms (except for the second entrant) lower average accident rates and thus increase occupational safety, consistent with the popular argument. However, with other functional specifications, the model could yield different results. As a result, the paper continues with an empirical investigation of the effect of monopsony power for a particular labor market -- nonunionized Kentucky coal mines in the later 70s -- a labor market which is likely to be particularly susceptible to monopsony. The empirical work shows that areas with many choices of alternative employers within easy driving distance do have lower accident rates. For this labor market, at least, when more alternative choices in the same occupation are offered, average occupational safety levels increase. Policies that improve occupational mobility and the competitiveness of labor markets, therefore, may simultaneously improve occupational safety.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w3897 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

November 1991.

A popular argument for safety regulations is that workers accept dangerous jobs because they have "no choice," or, in other words, because they have few or no alternative employment opportunities. This argument is considered in a game-theoretic framework. Because simultaneous-entry models do not yield pure-strategy equilibria, this paper develops a sequential-entry model to analyze the effect of additional firms on occupational safety. Within the context of the particular functional specification modeled, additional firms (except for the second entrant) lower average accident rates and thus increase occupational safety, consistent with the popular argument. However, with other functional specifications, the model could yield different results. As a result, the paper continues with an empirical investigation of the effect of monopsony power for a particular labor market -- nonunionized Kentucky coal mines in the later 70s -- a labor market which is likely to be particularly susceptible to monopsony. The empirical work shows that areas with many choices of alternative employers within easy driving distance do have lower accident rates. For this labor market, at least, when more alternative choices in the same occupation are offered, average occupational safety levels increase. Policies that improve occupational mobility and the competitiveness of labor markets, therefore, may simultaneously improve occupational safety.