Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior / Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell.

By:

Kaplow, Louis

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w3822.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

H - Public Economics

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w3822 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)

Previous	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	No cover image available	Next
Previous	nber w3819 The European Monetary System: Credible at Last? /	nber w3820 Optimal Investment Strategies for University Endowment Funds /	nber w3821 Rules, Coordination and Manipulability Among Arbitrators /	nber w3822 Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior /	nber w3823 An Aggregate Demand - Aggregate Supply Analysis of Japanese Monetary Policy, 1973-1990 /	nber w3824 Money, Output and Prices: Evidence from A New Monetary Aggregate /	nber w3825 Multinational Firms, Technology Diffusion and Trade /	Next

August 1991.

Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions.