An Altered U.S. Housing Finance System: Implications for Housing / Patric H. Hendershott.

By:

Hendershott, Patric H

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w3770.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government closely regulated the single-family housing finance system. The regulation manifested itself in a highly specialized system with four notable characteristics: portfolio restrictions against investments in corporate assets, tax inducements to invest in residential mortgages, prohibitions against investing in ARMS, and deposit rates ceilings. All were removed in the 1980s, and, not surprisingly, the housing finance system changed markedly. Between early 1982 and 1989, two-fifths of all new loans had adjustable, not fixed, rates, and savings and loans reduced their holdings of FRMs (both whole loans and mortgage pass-throughs) by 15 to 20 percent. Moreover, the fraction of conventional FRM originations that have been pooled into pass-throughs rose from less than one-twentieth before 1981 to over one-half after 1985. With the opportunity of borrowers to shift to lower coupon ARMs when rates rise and with the integration of the home mortgage market with capital markets generally, one would expect that the U.S. housing sector is now less sensitive to rising interest rates than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous studies support this expectation.

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Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w3770 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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July 1991.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government closely regulated the single-family housing finance system. The regulation manifested itself in a highly specialized system with four notable characteristics: portfolio restrictions against investments in corporate assets, tax inducements to invest in residential mortgages, prohibitions against investing in ARMS, and deposit rates ceilings. All were removed in the 1980s, and, not surprisingly, the housing finance system changed markedly. Between early 1982 and 1989, two-fifths of all new loans had adjustable, not fixed, rates, and savings and loans reduced their holdings of FRMs (both whole loans and mortgage pass-throughs) by 15 to 20 percent. Moreover, the fraction of conventional FRM originations that have been pooled into pass-throughs rose from less than one-twentieth before 1981 to over one-half after 1985. With the opportunity of borrowers to shift to lower coupon ARMs when rates rise and with the integration of the home mortgage market with capital markets generally, one would expect that the U.S. housing sector is now less sensitive to rising interest rates than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous studies support this expectation.