Externalities from Labor Mobility / Laurence Ball.

By:

Ball, Laurence

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w3720.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

J60 - General

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: This paper assumes that workers can move from a market with high unemployment to one with low unemployment at a cost. In principle. equilibrium mobility can be greater or less than the social optimum. For most plausible parameter values. however. mobility is too low. Intuitively. mobility has a beneficial externality: it helps workers remaining in the high-unemployment market by reducing competition for jobs. Mobility hurts workers in the market that movers join, but this effect is usually smaller.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w3720 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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May 1991.

This paper assumes that workers can move from a market with high unemployment to one with low unemployment at a cost. In principle. equilibrium mobility can be greater or less than the social optimum. For most plausible parameter values. however. mobility is too low. Intuitively. mobility has a beneficial externality: it helps workers remaining in the high-unemployment market by reducing competition for jobs. Mobility hurts workers in the market that movers join, but this effect is usually smaller.