Efficient and Inefficient Employment Outcomes: A Study Based on Canadian Data / Louis N. Christofides, Andrew J. Oswald.

By:

Christofides, Louis N

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w3648.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1991.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

J - Labor and Demographic Economics

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: This paper estimates employment equations based on the traditional labour demand model and modern efficient bargain theory using data drawn from wage contracts signed in the Canadian private unionized sector between 1978 and 1984. Contrary to the labour demand model predictions, the alternative wage rate is consistently significant and has the negative coefficient predicted by efficient bargain theory. Though a credible labour demand model can sometimes be estimated, the results are sensitive to the assumed market structure and to the introduction of alternative wage and unemployment insurance variables. Non-nested tests favour efficient bargain specifications.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w3648 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

March 1991.

This paper estimates employment equations based on the traditional labour demand model and modern efficient bargain theory using data drawn from wage contracts signed in the Canadian private unionized sector between 1978 and 1984. Contrary to the labour demand model predictions, the alternative wage rate is consistently significant and has the negative coefficient predicted by efficient bargain theory. Though a credible labour demand model can sometimes be estimated, the results are sensitive to the assumed market structure and to the introduction of alternative wage and unemployment insurance variables. Non-nested tests favour efficient bargain specifications.