Capital Controls, Collection Costs, and Domestic Public Debt / Joshua Aizenman, Pablo E. Guidotti.

By:

Aizenman, Joshua

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w3443.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1990.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

F - International Economics

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Abstract: The implications of a large public debt for the implementation of capital controls for an economy where tax revenue collection is costly are examined. Conditions are analyzed under which policymakers will resort to capital controls to reduce the cost of recycling domestic public debt. The linkages between a costly tax collection mechanism, capital controls, am domestic government debt are explored in terms of a two-period m:x1el of optimal taxation. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate haw capital controls are linked to different domestic public debt levels am to different degrees of efficiency in tax-revenue collection.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w3443 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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September 1990.

The implications of a large public debt for the implementation of capital controls for an economy where tax revenue collection is costly are examined. Conditions are analyzed under which policymakers will resort to capital controls to reduce the cost of recycling domestic public debt. The linkages between a costly tax collection mechanism, capital controls, am domestic government debt are explored in terms of a two-period m:x1el of optimal taxation. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate haw capital controls are linked to different domestic public debt levels am to different degrees of efficiency in tax-revenue collection.