Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages / Joshua Rosett.
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w3187 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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November 1989.
I estimate changes in levels of union real wage growth associated with corporate takeovers and accompanying chief executive officer changes. The effects are statistically insignificant. The results are used to construct union wealth changes associated with corporate control events. Target fire shareholder wealth premiums are estimated using a simple market model. The union and shareholder wealth changes are compared, and I conclude that transfers of wealth from unions to shareholders ate not an economically significant explanation of shareholder wealth premiums.
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