Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations Revisted / Raquel Fernandez, Robert W. Rosenthal.

By:

Fernandez, Raquel

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w2981.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1989.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

F - International Economics

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Abstract: The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. An earlier paper provided a game-theoretic basis for this contention. in that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game modeled have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. Two related games are analyzed here. Equilibria in which the debtor captures some of the surplus are shown to exist in one of them but not the other, and the roles of various assumptions in all three games is examined.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w2981 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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May 1989.

The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. An earlier paper provided a game-theoretic basis for this contention. in that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game modeled have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. Two related games are analyzed here. Equilibria in which the debtor captures some of the surplus are shown to exist in one of them but not the other, and the roles of various assumptions in all three games is examined.