Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation / Raquel Fernandez, David Kaaret.

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Fernandez, Raquel

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w2704.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Online resources:

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Abstract: This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w2704 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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September 1988.

This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks.