External Debt, Planning Horizon and Distorted Credit Markets / Joshua Aizenman.

By:

Aizenman, Joshua

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w2662.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1988.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

F - International Economics

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the role of policies in the presence of country risk with overdiscounting by the policy maker. Overdiscounting may reflect political uncertainty, which makes the effective planning horizon of the centralized government shorter than that of the private sector. The consequence of overdiscounting is to shift the supply curve facing the economy leftwards. The role of optimal borrowing policies in the presence of country risk is to discourage borrowing for consumption purposes, encourage investment in openness, and discourage investment in activities that reduce openness. The effect of overdiscounting by the policy maker is to increase the values of the optimal policy instruments (i.e. to increase the magnitude of the borrowing taxes and subsidies). Increasing the relative importance of open activities can be viewed as a way to reduce the harmful consequences of overdiscounting. Overdiscounting may rationalize various conditionality clauses that will induce the economy to follow the desired credit market policies.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w2662 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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July 1988.

The purpose of this paper is to study the role of policies in the presence of country risk with overdiscounting by the policy maker. Overdiscounting may reflect political uncertainty, which makes the effective planning horizon of the centralized government shorter than that of the private sector. The consequence of overdiscounting is to shift the supply curve facing the economy leftwards. The role of optimal borrowing policies in the presence of country risk is to discourage borrowing for consumption purposes, encourage investment in openness, and discourage investment in activities that reduce openness. The effect of overdiscounting by the policy maker is to increase the values of the optimal policy instruments (i.e. to increase the magnitude of the borrowing taxes and subsidies). Increasing the relative importance of open activities can be viewed as a way to reduce the harmful consequences of overdiscounting. Overdiscounting may rationalize various conditionality clauses that will induce the economy to follow the desired credit market policies.