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Capital Accumulation and Annuities in an Adverse Selection Economy / Martin S. Eichenbaum, Dan S. Peled.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w2046.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1986.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Abstract: This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity constrained equilibria in which some agents whose length of lifetime is uncertain find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on annuities. The welfare properties of these allocations are analyzed. It is shown that the level of capital accumulation is excessive in a Paretian sense. Policies which eliminate this inefficiency are discussed.
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Working Paper Biblioteca Digital Colección NBER nber w2046 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not For Loan
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October 1986.

This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity markets can generate quantity constrained equilibria in which some agents whose length of lifetime is uncertain find it advantageous to accumulate capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on annuities. The welfare properties of these allocations are analyzed. It is shown that the level of capital accumulation is excessive in a Paretian sense. Policies which eliminate this inefficiency are discussed.

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

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