Issues in the Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy / Alan S. Blinder.

By:

Blinder, Alan S

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w0982.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1982.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: This paper examines issues in the current debate over coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Section I1 uses the traditional targets-instruments approach to assess the potential gains from greater coordination. Since greater coordination is often equated with looser money and tighter fiscal policy, two econometric models of the economy are used to estimate the quantitative importance of the policy mix. Expectational effects that arise from the government budget constraint are also analyzed. Section III shows that our attitudes toward the non- coordination problem may be quite different depending on why policies were not coordinated to begin with, and argues that there are plausible circumstances under which it may be better to have uncoordinated policies. Section IV turns to the design of a coordination system. The game-theoretic aspects of having two independent authorities are stressed, and I offer a general reason to expect that uncoordinated behavior will result in tight money and loose fiscal policy even when both parties would prefer easy money and tight fiscal policy. Finally, Section, considers the old "rules versus discretion" debate from the particular perspective of this paper.

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September 1982.

This paper examines issues in the current debate over coordination between fiscal and monetary policies. Section I1 uses the traditional targets-instruments approach to assess the potential gains from greater coordination. Since greater coordination is often equated with looser money and tighter fiscal policy, two econometric models of the economy are used to estimate the quantitative importance of the policy mix. Expectational effects that arise from the government budget constraint are also analyzed. Section III shows that our attitudes toward the non- coordination problem may be quite different depending on why policies were not coordinated to begin with, and argues that there are plausible circumstances under which it may be better to have uncoordinated policies. Section IV turns to the design of a coordination system. The game-theoretic aspects of having two independent authorities are stressed, and I offer a general reason to expect that uncoordinated behavior will result in tight money and loose fiscal policy even when both parties would prefer easy money and tight fiscal policy. Finally, Section, considers the old "rules versus discretion" debate from the particular perspective of this paper.