Macroeconometric Modelling for Policy Evaluation and Design / Willem H. Buiter.

By:

Buiter, Willem H

Contributor(s):

National Bureau of Economic Research

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Technical Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. t0013.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1981.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: The paper reviews recent developments in macroeconomic theory and their implications for econometric modelling and for policy design. The following issues are addressed. 1) The theoretical and practical problems of modelling sequence economies. 2) Problems of evaluating the role of money given the absence of reasonable microfoundations for monetary theory. 3) The implications of the view that macroeconomic models should be viewed as non-cooperative differential games. 4) Identification and estimation of the policy-invariant structure of rational expectations models. 5) Time inconsistency of optimal plans and 6) The welfare economics of stabilization policy and the need to pay much greater attention to market structure if a market failure-based justification for stabilization policy is to be developed.

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Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber t0013 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

June 1981.

The paper reviews recent developments in macroeconomic theory and their implications for econometric modelling and for policy design. The following issues are addressed. 1) The theoretical and practical problems of modelling sequence economies. 2) Problems of evaluating the role of money given the absence of reasonable microfoundations for monetary theory. 3) The implications of the view that macroeconomic models should be viewed as non-cooperative differential games. 4) Identification and estimation of the policy-invariant structure of rational expectations models. 5) Time inconsistency of optimal plans and 6) The welfare economics of stabilization policy and the need to pay much greater attention to market structure if a market failure-based justification for stabilization policy is to be developed.