Corporate Governance in Developing, Transition and Emerging-Market Economies [electronic resource] / Charles P. Oman, Steven Fries and Willem Buiter
Material type: ArticleSeries: OECD Development Centre Policy Briefs ; no.23.Publication details: Paris : OECD Publishing, 2004.Description: 50 p. ; 21 x 29.7cmSubject(s): Online resources: Abstract: • Sound national systems of corporate governance are essential for all countries, including the poorest, to reap the benefits of globalisation. • "Corporate governance" comprises the institutions that govern the relationship between people who manage corporations and all others who invest resources in them. • The quality of local corporate governance critically affects a country's ability to achieve sustained real productivity growth and the success of its long-term development efforts. • Pyramidal corporate-ownership structures, cross shareholdings and multiple share classes are widely used by corporate insiders in the developing world to extract corporate-control rents, exploit other investors and resist pressures to improve corporate governance. • The power of corporate insiders and their close relationship with those who exercise political power mean that sound corporate governance requires sound political governance, and vice versa.Other editions: La gouvernance d'entreprise dans les pays en développement, en transition et les économies émergentesItem type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección OECD | OECD 604227826337 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
• Sound national systems of corporate governance are essential for all countries, including the poorest, to reap the benefits of globalisation. • "Corporate governance" comprises the institutions that govern the relationship between people who manage corporations and all others who invest resources in them. • The quality of local corporate governance critically affects a country's ability to achieve sustained real productivity growth and the success of its long-term development efforts. • Pyramidal corporate-ownership structures, cross shareholdings and multiple share classes are widely used by corporate insiders in the developing world to extract corporate-control rents, exploit other investors and resist pressures to improve corporate governance. • The power of corporate insiders and their close relationship with those who exercise political power mean that sound corporate governance requires sound political governance, and vice versa.
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