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Auctions in the Electricity Market [electronic resource] : Bidding when Production Capacity Is Constrained / by Stefan Schöne.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 617Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2009Edition: 1st ed. 2009Description: XVI, 218 p. 40 illus. online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783540853657
Subject(s): Additional physical formats: Printed edition:: No title; Printed edition:: No titleDDC classification:
  • 333.7
LOC classification:
  • HC79.E5
Online resources:
Contents:
Literature Review -- Model -- Results -- Conclusion.
In: Springer Nature eBookSummary: Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.
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Holdings
Item type Home library Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode Item holds
E-Book E-Book Biblioteca Digital Colección SPRINGER 333.7 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not For Loan
Total holds: 0

Literature Review -- Model -- Results -- Conclusion.

Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.

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