to the Series "Game Equilibrium Models" -- to Volume III: "Strategic Bargaining" -- A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem -- A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts -- Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games -- Folk Theorems for the Proposal-Making Model -- A Noncooperative Model of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games -- Demand Commitment Bargaining: - The Case of Apex Games -- Prominence, Competition, Learning, and the Generation of Offers in Computer-Aided Experimental Spatial Games -- Original or Fake - A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information -- Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game -- A Game Equilibrium Model of Thin Markets.

The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.