Towards a Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe [electronic resource] / edited by Herbert Giersch.
Material type:
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9783642765728
- 330
- HB71-74
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Biblioteca Digital | Colección SPRINGER | 330 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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Some General Lessons from West Germany's Postwar Experiences -- West Germany's Economic Reforms of 1948: The Lessons for Central and Eastern Europe Today -- How It All Began: Sources of the Recent Breakdown of the Soviet Economic System -- Main Obstacles to Rapid Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe: The Czechoslovak View -- The Polish Program of Stabilization -- Experiences and Prospects: The Case of Hungary -- Experiences and Prospects: The Case of the USSR -- Experiences and Prospects: The Case of the GDR -- German Economic Integration in a European Perspective -- List of Contributors.
In 1990, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began or accelerated their transition to a market economy. This book addresses among others the following questions: (I) What are the fundamental causes of the collapse of the Soviet-type economic systems? (II) What major steps could be taken to make the transition process to a market economy irreversible and less painful? (III) What can be learned from West Germany's outstandingly successful postwar economic reforms? (IV) Is the issue of gradualism versus shock therapy still relevant? (V) If macroeconomic stability is a precondition, what is the role of privatization, deregulation and trade liberalization? (VI) What is the optimal sequence of steps in privatization, deregulation, liberalization and currency convertibility? (VII) How quickly may privatization be achieved? (VIII) Is the USSR really a special case and, if so, in what respects and for what fundamental reasons? (IX) How long in the transition period may the initial phase of disorder, chaos and decline last? (X) What can be learned from the experiences gathered so far in the major ex-communist countries?
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