Occupational Licensing and Accountant Quality: Evidence from the 150-Hour Rule / John M. Barrios.
Material type:
- D45 - Rationing • Licensing
- I21 - Analysis of Education
- J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
- K2 - Regulation and Business Law
- L51 - Economics of Regulation
- M1 - Business Administration
- M12 - Personnel Management • Executives; Executive Compensation
- M21 - Business Economics
- M4 - Accounting and Auditing
- M40 - General
- M41 - Accounting
- M5 - Personnel Economics
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w29318 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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October 2021.
I examine the effects of occupational licensing on the quality of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). I exploit the staggered adoption of the 150-hour rule, which increases the educational requirements for a CPA license. The analysis shows that the rule decreases the number of entrants into the profession, reducing both low- and high-quality candidates. Labor market proxies for quality find no difference between 150-hour rule CPAs and the rest. Moreover, rule CPAs exit public accounting at similar rates and have comparable writing quality to their non-rule counterparts. Overall, these findings are consistent with the theoretical argument that increases in licensing requirements restrict the supply of entrants and do little to improve quality in the labor market.
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