Clubs and Networks in Economics Reviewing / Scott E. Carrell, David N. Figlio, Lester R. Lusher.

By:

Carrell, Scott E

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w29631.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

A11 - Role of Economics • Role of Economists • Market for Economists

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Abstract: The network of economists who publish in leading journals is generally perceived as small, exclusive, and tightly knit. We study how author-editor and author-reviewer network connectivity and "match" influences editor decisions and reviewer recommendations of economic research at the Journal of Human Resources (JHR). Our empirical strategy employs several dimensions of fixed effects to overcome concerns of endogenous assignment of papers to editors and reviewers in order to identify causal impacts. Results show that clubs and networks play a large role in influencing both editor and reviewer decisions. Authors who attended the same PhD program, were ever colleagues with, are affiliates of the same NBER program(s), or are more closely linked via coauthorship networks as the handling editor are significantly more likely to avoid a desk rejection. Likewise, authors from the same PhD program or who previously worked with the reviewer are significantly more likely to receive a positive evaluation. We also find that sharing "signals" of ability, such as publishing in "top five", attending a high ranked PhD program, or being employed by a similarly ranked economics department significantly influences editor decisions and/or reviewer recommendations.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w29631 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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Previous	nber w29629 Global Innovation and Knowledge Diffusion /	nber w2963 Crumbling Pillar? Declining Union Density in Japan /	nber w29630 Nonprofits in Good Times and Bad Times /	nber w29631 Clubs and Networks in Economics Reviewing /	nber w29632 Intermediation via Credit Chains /	nber w29633 Currency Carry Trade by Trucks: The Curious Case of China's Massive Imports from Itself /	nber w29634 Cognitive Decline, Limited Awareness, Imperfect Agency, and Financial Well-being /	Next

January 2022.

The network of economists who publish in leading journals is generally perceived as small, exclusive, and tightly knit. We study how author-editor and author-reviewer network connectivity and "match" influences editor decisions and reviewer recommendations of economic research at the Journal of Human Resources (JHR). Our empirical strategy employs several dimensions of fixed effects to overcome concerns of endogenous assignment of papers to editors and reviewers in order to identify causal impacts. Results show that clubs and networks play a large role in influencing both editor and reviewer decisions. Authors who attended the same PhD program, were ever colleagues with, are affiliates of the same NBER program(s), or are more closely linked via coauthorship networks as the handling editor are significantly more likely to avoid a desk rejection. Likewise, authors from the same PhD program or who previously worked with the reviewer are significantly more likely to receive a positive evaluation. We also find that sharing "signals" of ability, such as publishing in "top five", attending a high ranked PhD program, or being employed by a similarly ranked economics department significantly influences editor decisions and/or reviewer recommendations.