On ESG Investing: Heterogeneous Preferences, Information, and Asset Prices / Itay Goldstein, Alexandr Kopytov, Lin Shen, Haotian Xiang.

By:

Goldstein, Itay

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w29839.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2022.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

G14 - Information and Market Efficiency • Event Studies • Insider Trading
G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill

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Abstract: We study how environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing reshapes information aggregation by prices. We develop a rational expectations equilibrium model in which traditional and green investors are informed about financial and ESG risks but have different preferences over them. Because of the preference heterogeneity, traditional and green investors trade in the opposite directions based on the same information. We show that the equilibrium price may not be uniquely determined. An increase in the fraction of green investors and an improvement in the ESG information quality can reduce price informativeness about the financial payoff and raise the cost of capital.

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Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w29839 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

April 2022.

We study how environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing reshapes information aggregation by prices. We develop a rational expectations equilibrium model in which traditional and green investors are informed about financial and ESG risks but have different preferences over them. Because of the preference heterogeneity, traditional and green investors trade in the opposite directions based on the same information. We show that the equilibrium price may not be uniquely determined. An increase in the fraction of green investors and an improvement in the ESG information quality can reduce price informativeness about the financial payoff and raise the cost of capital.