A Study of Bid-rigging in Procurement Auctions: Evidence from Indonesia, Georgia, Mongolia, Malta, and State of California / Kei Kawai, Jun Nakabayashi, Daichi Shimamoto.
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- L41
- O52
- O53
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w30271 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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July 2022.
We apply a Regression Discontinuity based approach to screen for collusion developed in Kawai et al. (2022) to public procurement data from five countries. We find that bidders who win by a very small margin have significantly lower backlog than those who lose by a very small margin in the sample of procurement auctions from Indonesia, suggesting that bidders collude by bid rotation. Our results suggest that the proportion of noncompetitive auctions is at least about 5% for all E-procurement auctions and about 3% for all auctions in Indonesia. We cannot reject the null of competition in other countries.
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