Can Fiscal Externalities Be Internalized? / Erzo F.P. Luttmer.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- General
- General
- Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Social Innovation
- Social Innovation
- D02
- H10
- H23
- O35
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
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Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w30213 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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July 2022.
Subsidies and in-kind transfers give rise to negative fiscal externalities. However, internalizing negative fiscal externalities through taxation would undo the subsidy or in-kind transfer that caused them. Similarly, positive fiscal externalities cannot be internalized though government subsidies. This paper describes a mechanism that transfers fiscal externalities from the government to private parties. Such transfers generate incentives within the private sector to reduce inefficiencies caused by fiscal externalities. Thus, the paper offers a straightforward, but powerful, insight: transferring fiscal externalities to third parties extends the reach of the Coase Theorem to inefficiencies stemming from fiscal externalities.
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