Dynamic Price Competition: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets / Ali Hortaçsu, Aniko Oery, Kevin R. Williams.
Material type:
- General
- General
- Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- Firm Behavior: Theory
- Firm Behavior: Theory
- Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- General
- General
- Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Air Transportation
- Air Transportation
- C70
- C73
- D21
- D22
- D43
- D60
- L13
- L93
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w30347 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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August 2022.
We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential equations. Using unique and comprehensive pricing and bookings data for competing U.S. airlines, we estimate our model and find that dynamic pricing results in higher output but lower welfare than under uniform pricing. Our theoretical and empirical findings run counter to standard results in single-firm settings due to the strategic role of competitor scarcity. Pricing heuristics commonly used by airlines increase welfare relative to estimated equilibrium predictions.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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