Connected Lending of Last Resort / Kris James Mitchener, Eric Monnet.

By:

Mitchener, Kris James

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w30869.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

Other classification:

Online resources:

Available additional physical forms:

Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers

Abstract: Because of secrecy, little is known about the political economy of central bank lending. Utilizing a novel, hand-collected historical daily dataset on loans to commercial banks, we analyze how personal connections matter for lending of last resort, highlighting the importance of governance for this core function of central banks. We show that, when faced with a banking panic in November 1930, the Banque de France (BdF) lent selectively rather than broadly, providing substantially more liquidity to connected banks - those whose board members were BdF shareholders. The BdF's selective lending policy failed to internalize a negative externality - that lending would be insufficient to arrest the panic and that distress via contagion would spillover to connected banks. Connected lending of last resort fueled the worst banking crisis in French history, caused an unprecedented government bailout of the central bank, and resulted in loss of shareholder control over the central bank.

Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w30869 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

Total holds: 0

January 2023.

Because of secrecy, little is known about the political economy of central bank lending. Utilizing a novel, hand-collected historical daily dataset on loans to commercial banks, we analyze how personal connections matter for lending of last resort, highlighting the importance of governance for this core function of central banks. We show that, when faced with a banking panic in November 1930, the Banque de France (BdF) lent selectively rather than broadly, providing substantially more liquidity to connected banks - those whose board members were BdF shareholders. The BdF's selective lending policy failed to internalize a negative externality - that lending would be insufficient to arrest the panic and that distress via contagion would spillover to connected banks. Connected lending of last resort fueled the worst banking crisis in French history, caused an unprecedented government bailout of the central bank, and resulted in loss of shareholder control over the central bank.