Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions / Rocco Macchiavello, Ameet Morjaria.
Material type:
TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w30978.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): - Economics of Contract: Theory
- Economics of Contract: Theory
- Empirical Studies of Trade
- Empirical Studies of Trade
- Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
- Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks
- International Linkages to Development • Role of International Organizations
- International Linkages to Development • Role of International Organizations
- D86
- F14
- L14
- O19
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
| Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w30978 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
February 2023.
Relational contracts - informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated interactions - are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries. This review highlights recent empirical contributions in selected areas. We begin by reviewing some recent work that explicitly takes the dynamic incentive compatibility constraints that underpin relational contract models to the data. We then discuss the relationship between relational contracting and firms' performance. We conclude pointing in directions that we consider to be particularly ripe for future work.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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