Financial Integration and Monetary Policy Coordination / Javier Bianchi, Louphou Coulibaly.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- Consumption • Saving • Wealth
- Consumption • Saving • Wealth
- Production
- Production
- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- Monetary Policy
- Monetary Policy
- Fiscal Policy • Modern Monetary Theory
- Fiscal Policy • Modern Monetary Theory
- Current Account Adjustment • Short-Term Capital Movements
- Current Account Adjustment • Short-Term Capital Movements
- E21
- E23
- E43
- E44
- E52
- E62
- F32
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w32009 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
December 2023.
Financial integration generates macroeconomic spillovers that may require international monetary policy coordination. We show that individual central banks may set nominal interest rates too low or too high relative to the cooperative outcome. We identify three sufficient statistics that determine whether the Nash equilibrium exhibits under-tightening or over-tightening: the output gap, sectoral differences in labor intensity, and the trade balance response to changes in nominal rates. Independently of the shocks hitting the economy, we find that under-tightening is possible during economic expansions or contractions. For large shocks, the gains from coordination can be substantial.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.