Professional Motivations in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Officers / Aaron Chalfin, Felipe M. Gonçalves.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- J33
- J45
- K42
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w31985 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
Collection: Colección NBER Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
December 2023.
We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Print version record
There are no comments on this title.